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I. Introduction
This paper explores California’s and Massachusetts’ Global Warming
Solutions Acts, the policy plans released by each state’s lead regulatory
agencies, and related laws that form each states’ greenhouse gas regulatory
framework. First, it examines California’s renewable portfolio standard
(“RPS”) and Global Warming Solutions Act, including the legal battles
California has faced in defending various aspects of its greenhouse gas
regulation framework.
Then, it discusses the laws comprising
Massachusetts’ greenhouse gas regulation framework, including the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”), an agreement between several
northeastern states to jointly limit their total greenhouse gas emissions. It
will also examine legal hurdles RGGI has overcome. Finally, this paper sets
forth elements critical to a greenhouse gas regulation framework using the
early successes of California and Massachusetts as a model.

II. California
A. California’s Renewable Portfolio Standard
In 2002, the California legislature established the state’s first RPS,
which required 20% of the energy from its investor-owned utilities to come
from renewable sources by 2017.1 In each of the following two years, the
California Energy Commission (“CEC”) published reports recommending
acceleration of the RPS program to 33% by 2020.2 The legislature responded
to these recommendations in 2006 by passing S.B. 107, which increased the
mandate to require 20% of electricity generated from renewable sources by
2010.3 To prevent utility recalcitrance, the legislature directed the California
Public Utilities Commission (“CPUC”) to require each retail electricity seller
to procure at least 1% renewable energy generation additional to the
amount procured the previous year.4 Publicly owned utilities set their own
RPS goals at varying levels, but recognize the legislature’s intent to attain

* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2015;
B.A., University of Southern California, 2012. I would like to thank the staff of WestNorthwest for their hard work.
1. S.B. 1078, ch. 516, §3, 2002 CAL. STAT. 2942, 2949 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE).
2. Cal. Energy Comm’n, California Renewable Energy Overview and Programs,
ENERGY.CA.GOV, http://www.energy.ca.gov/renewables/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2015).
3. S.B. 107, ch. 464, 2006 Cal. Stat. 3298 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of CAL. PUB. RES. CODE and CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE).
4. S.B. 107, ch. 464, §9, 2006 Cal. Stat. 3298, 3309 (codified as amended at CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 25746).
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20% by 2010.5 The CEC was tasked with certifying eligible renewable energy
sources (e.g., solar, wind, small hydro, and biomass facilities) and designing
and implementing an accounting system to verify compliance with the RPS.6
By 2008, the CPUC had approved more than sixty-three gigawatts of
renewable energy contracts for its investor-owned utilities—demonstrating
the viability of renewable energy in an arena dominated by fossil fuels.7 In
November 2008, Executive Order S-14-08 further accelerated California’s
RPS goal by requiring that all retail sellers of electricity serve their load with
33% renewable energy by 2020.8 This executive action was implemented
through the coordinated action of multiple state agencies, like the CPUC,
CEC, California Air Resources Board (“CARB”), the Department of Fish and
Game (for appropriate land use), and even the Western Governors’
Association (to facilitate efficient development of renewable energy through
a regional cap-and-trade system).9
Unfortunately, California was only able to procure about 18%
renewable energy sources by 2010, narrowly missing its stated goal.10 One
author cites the overlapping and unclear lines of authority in implementing
the standard as a primary cause of failing to meet the target.11 In an effort to
meet future goals, the state executive office directed the CPUC, CEC, and
California Independent System Operator (“CAISO”), under a series of
executive orders and the RPS statutes, to work together with stakeholders to
identify how and where renewable energy can be developed.12 Executive
Order S-21-09 directs those agencies to “provide advice and assistance to,
and cooperate with” CARB in its implementation of RPS-related regulation.13
Coordinating this united effort of agencies has proven to be a difficult task
because they have struggled to coalesce their varying perspectives and
harmoniously implement different facets of the RPS program.14
Additionally, inconsistent positions in related policy areas have resulted

5. Cal. Energy Comm’n, California Renewable Energy Overview and Programs,
ENERGY.CA.GOV, http://www.energy.ca.gov/renewables/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2015).
6. S.B. 107, ch. 464, §9, 2006 Cal. Stat. 3298, (codified as amended at CAL. PUB.
RES. CODE § 25746).
7. Cal. Exec.
php?id=11072.

Order

S-14-08

(Nov.

8.

Id.

9.

Cal. Exec. Order S-14-08, supra note 7.

17,

2008),

http://gov.ca.gov/news.

10. Debroah Behles, Why California Failed to Meet its RPS Target, 17 HASTINGS W.N.W. J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 163, 170 (2011).
11.

Id. at 172.

12.

Id.

13.

Id.

14.

Id.
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from numerous executive orders directing different agencies to handle
overlapping responsibilities, further slowing the administrative process.15
Nonetheless, in an effort to further California’s ambitious effort,
Governor Edmund Brown and the legislature passed S.B. X1-2, which
codified the 33% by 2020 requirement.16 Critically, this bill applied to all
electricity retailers in the state: investor and publicly owned utilities,
electricity service providers, and community choice aggregators.17 In 2013,
California’s large investor owned utilities served 22.7% of their retail
electricity sales with renewable power.18 While the 33% by 2020 goal seems
difficult to reach, several California agencies have engaged in an iterative
policy development process that is pushing electricity sales toward the
ambitious goal. For example, the CPUC has been developing simpler
procurement mechanisms to streamline the application process for
renewable generators19 and has enjoyed the success of the California Solar
Initiative, a program with a two billion dollar budget over ten years.20 The
CEC is administering a four hundred million dollar program, called the New
Solar Homes Partnership, to offer incentives for solar installations and
energy efficiency in new residential construction.21
In sum, RPS development in California has been mostly successful at
procuring renewable generation, despite its struggles, because it has
encouraged policy evolution to ensure effective and appropriate regulation
of the burgeoning renewable industry. As regulators continue to develop
policy tools to push utilities forward, they become better equipped and
trained to regulate the growing industry. While it is impossible to design
the perfect renewable procurement methods overnight, the development
and availability of policy tools has proven critical in pushing California’s RPS
program in the right direction over time. Moreover, as this paper will reveal,

15.

Id. at 172–73.

16. S.B. X1-2, ch. 1, § 20, 2011 Cal. Legis. Serv. 5775, 5791 (West) (codified as
amended at CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 399.15).
17. Cal. Energy Comm’n, California Renewable Energy Overview and Programs,
ENERGY.CA.GOV, http://www.energy.ca.gov/renewables/ (last visited Feb. 10, 2015). For
discussion on importance of broad utility inclusion, see Miriam Fischlein & Timothy
M. Smith, Revisiting renewable portfolio standard effectiveness: policy design and outcome
specification matter, 46 POL’Y SCI. 277, 281 (2013).
18. California Renewables Portfolio Standard, CPUC.CA.GOV, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/
PUC/energy/Renewables (last visited Feb. 10, 2015).
19.

See e.g., CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N Ruling 11-05-005.

20. Cal. Energy Comm’n, California Renewable Energy Overview and Programs,
ENERGY.CA.GOV, http://www.energy.ca.gov/renewables (last visited Feb. 10, 2015).
21. What is the New Solar Homes Partnership?, GOSOLARCALIFORNIA.ORG,
http://www.gosolarcalifornia.org/about/nshp.php (last visited Feb. 10, 2015).
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the RPS is relatively immune to legal challenges when compared to the
Global Warming Solutions Act, which mandates that regulated entities begin
internalizing the costs of carbon emissions.22

B. California’s Global Warming Solutions Act
1. Background and Current Scoping Plan Status
The Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (“AB 32”) requires California
to reduce its greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels by 2020.23 Pursuant
to this goal, the legislature directed CARB to adopt regulations that “achieve
the maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective greenhouse gas
emission reductions.”24 The bill also directed CARB to adopt market-based
compliance mechanisms.25 In the broader context of quarreling over climate
change in national politics, California defined carbon dioxide as a
“greenhouse gas”26 and declared that “[g]lobal warming poses a serious
threat to the economic well-being, public health, natural resources, and the
environment of California.”27
In order to fulfill AB 32’s goals, CARB is required to develop, and
update every five years, a Scoping Plan that identifies technologically
feasible and cost-effective regulations for reducing greenhouse gas
emissions.28 These regulations will be evaluated using a cost-benefit
analysis that takes into account both economic and noneconomic benefits
of the plan.29 Moreover, CARB must coordinate with the CPUC and CEC in
publishing its plan30 and conduct public workshops to gather comments on
plan updates.31 These general statutory directives proved beneficial in
future litigation over the Scoping Plan because they gave CARB broad
authority to design and implement climate change law.

22. California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006, ch. 488, 2006 Cal. Stat.
3419 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38500).
23.

Id.

24.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562 (West 2014).

25.

HEALTH & SAFETY § 38570.

26. HEALTH & SAFETY § 38505(g). The other gases included in this definition are
methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulfur hexafluoride,
and nitrogen trifluoride.
27.

HEALTH & SAFETY § 38501(a).

28.

HEALTH & SAFETY § 38561(a).

29.

HEALTH & SAFETY § 38561(d).

30.

HEALTH & SAFETY § 38561(a).

31.

HEALTH & SAFETY § 38561(g).
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Key regulatory elements of the initial Scoping Plan included expanding
energy efficiency programs (e.g., setting building and appliance standards),
increasing the state’s RPS goal to 33% by 2020, strengthening greenhouse
gas emission standards on passenger vehicles, supporting development of
the California high speed rail project, and developing a cap-and-trade
program.32 The initial plan and the May 2014 Update identified and
recommended greenhouse gas reduction measures in six key areas of the
state’s economy: energy, transportation, agriculture, water, waste
management, and natural and working lands.33
Pursuant to California’s zero net energy building goals, the CEC
updated new residential construction energy efficiency standards to 25%,
and 30% for nonresidential construction.34 It also adopted efficiency
standards for televisions, battery chargers, and is considering creating
additional appliance categories to regulate consumer electronics, lighting,
and water appliances.35 Additionally, the Scoping Plan supports demand
response programs, localized renewable energy, and energy storage.36
Together, these developments will better equip California’s electric grid and
regulators for emerging technologies from the energy industry that are
designed to further enable renewable procurement.
In the transportation sector, the Advanced Clean Cars program, part of
the Zero Emission Vehicle Regulation, requires 15% of new cars sold in
California to be plug-in hybrid, battery electric, or fuel cell vehicles by
2025.37 Ten other states have adopted California’s Zero Emission Vehicle
Regulation, expanding the reach of California’s policy to nearly a quarter of
the United States vehicle market.38 Another major component of the
Scoping Plan is investment in the high-speed rail project, predicted to be
running from San Francisco to Los Angeles by 2029.39 California also
adopted a low-carbon fuel standard in 2009 that requires the carbon
intensity of transportation fuels to be reduced by at least 10% by 2020.40

32. AIR RES. BD. & CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, FIRST UPDATE TO THE CLIMATE
CHANGE SCOPING PLAN 4 (2014), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/2013_
update/first_update_climate_change_scoping_plan.pdf.
33.

Id. at 35.

34.

Id. at 37.

35.

Id.

36.

Id. at 39–41.

37.

Id. at 47.

38.

Id.

39. Id. at 5. The Scoping Plan is devoid of specific elements designed to
bolster the high-speed rail project besides coordinate among state agencies to study
and invest in the project.
40.
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However, CARB noted that “[a]chieving the GHG and air quality goals will
require a renewable portfolio of transportation fuels—including electricity
and hydrogen—well beyond the current policy trajectories.”41 CARB added
that by the end of 2014 it would consider extending the standard with more
aggressive targets for 2030 to push development of a renewable portfolio of
transportation fuels.42
AB 32 and the Scoping Plan have also taken on California’s agricultural
sector in an effort to reduce the industry’s methane, carbon dioxide, nitrous
oxide, and black carbon emissions, which accounted for about 8% of
California’s total greenhouse gas emissions in 2012.43 However, CARB has
not been as successful in the agricultural sector as it has been in the
transportation sector. For example, the initial plan included the installation
of manure digesters to reduce methane emissions as a voluntary strategy,
and unsurprisingly, adoption of these digesters in dairies has not increased
to the levels that CARB expected.44 CARB asserts that the minimal success
in the agricultural sector may be due to the limited research in this area and
that there are a wide variety of farm sizes, animals, and crops produced,
which make it difficult to find any “one-size-fits-all” emission reduction or
carbon sequestration strategies.45
Another component of the Scoping Plan is the Cap-and-Trade
Regulation, a strategy enabled by AB 32’s market compliance mechanism
chapter. In January 2013, CARB launched the second-largest greenhouse gas
cap-and-trade program in the world with a hard and declining cap on
approximately 85% of total statewide greenhouse gas emissions.46
Currently, offsets and respective protocols exist for the six greenhouse gases
identified by AB 32, as well as for emissions of greenhouse gases prevented
through forestry, urban forestry, manure digesters, and ozone-depleting
substance destruction.47 In January 2014, California and Quebec linked their
cap-and-trade programs and the two states have worked together to
harmonize regulations and coordinate a joint auction platform.48 However,
the May 2014 Update to the Scoping Plan lacked details about what is

41.

Id. at 49.

42.

Id.

43.

Id. at 57.

44.

Id.

45.

Id. at 58.

46.

Id at 86.

47.

Id.

48. Id. at 87. CARB is also considering coordination with international sectorbased offset programs like REDD+. Id.
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planned to further bolster the cap-and-trade program, besides program
review and further research into offset protocol development.49
The May 2014 update to the Scoping Plan also addressed other sectors
of California’s economy, such as water, waste management, natural lands,
green buildings, and short-lived climate pollutants. CARB has been most
successful in the transportation and energy sectors, where there has been a
significant drop in carbon emissions since 2007.50 Despite 2012, the first
year of increased total carbon emissions since 2007,51 California’s per capita
greenhouse gas emissions have decreased by 11.6% between 2000 and
2012.52 California’s agencies are continuing to plan and develop regulation
of the identified industries. However, since the initial scoping plan, CARB’s
regulations have faced several legal challenges, some raising major
constitutional issues.
2. Legal Challenges to AB 32
Various elements of AB 32 have been subject to challenges in state
and federal court. However, CARB is well positioned to issue regulation in
California that addresses climate change because AB 32 has largely
withstood those legal battles. In state court, environmental justice
organizations contended that the cap-and-trade program was too flawed to
be a reasonable interpretation of AB 32. Additionally, in federal court,
ethanol and fossil fuel interests challenged CARB’s low carbon fuel
standards (“LCFS”) on Commerce Clause grounds. These legal battles are
addressed in turn.
i.

State Court Challenges

Before CARB could even adopt cap-and-trade regulations to
implement AB 32, it faced opposition from environmental justice
organizations in California. For example, the Association of Irritated
Residents and a group of other environmental plaintiffs sued CARB over its
early endorsement of a cap-and-trade program in its 2009 Scoping Plan.53 In
Irritated Residents, the petitioners alleged that the 2009 Scoping Plan:

49.

Id.

50.

Id. at 99.

51. Carbon emissions increased in 2012 largely due to increased natural gas
generation of in-state electricity due to the closure of the San Onofre Nuclear
Generating Station, a drought year decreasing hydropower generation, and an 11.3%
population increase over the ten years prior. See id. at 90.
52.

Id.

53. Assoc. of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 65, 70
(Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
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(a) [F]ails to achieve the maximum technologically feasible and
cost-effective reductions; (b) fails to require emissions reduction
measures for significant sources of emissions, namely industrial
and agricultural sources; (c) does not develop any policies to
avoid the pitfalls of other greenhouse gas emission trading
programs and fails to address how [C]ARB will monitor and
enforce reductions in a regional market; (d) fails to assess the
likely impacts of proposed policy choices and regulatory
programs and fails to propose policies to ensure that compliance
with chosen measures will not disproportionately impact already
overburdened communities; and (e) fails to prevent increases in
criteria and toxic co-pollutant emissions. Instead the Scoping
Plan’s analysis acts as a post hoc rationalization for the policy
decisions already chosen by [C]ARB.54
The trial court held that the plan did not violate the requirements of
AB 32, nor had CARB acted arbitrarily and capriciously in selecting the
measures it included in the 2009 Scoping Plan.55 Further, the trial court
rejected almost all of the plaintiffs’ contentions, but did find that CARB had
failed to adequately analyze alternatives to the cap-and-trade program and
provided no meaningful discussion about the carbon tax alternative.56
CARB quickly corrected this mistake and upon doing so, the trial court
discharged its earlier writ of mandate that prevented further implementation
of the Scoping Plan.57 Thus, the only issue remaining on appeal was
whether the Scoping Plan is within the regulatory authorization conferred by
AB 32.58
The Court of Appeal employed a deferential standard of review
because the adoption of the Scoping Plan was a quasi-legislative
administrative action issued under the broad statutory mandates of AB 32.59
“If it can be inferred from the authorizing legislation that a [public agency]
has been granted considerable discretion to determine what is necessary to
accomplish a valid legislative goal, a more deferential standard of review is

54.

Id. at 71.

55.

Id.

56.

Id.

57.

Id.

58.

Id. at 71.

59. Id. (“Because agencies granted such substantial rulemaking power are truly
‘making law,’ their quasi-legislative rules have the dignity of statutes. When a court
assesses the validity of such rules, the scope of its review is narrow. If satisfied that
the rule in question lay within the lawmaking authority delegated by the Legislature,
and that it is reasonably necessary to implement the purpose of the statute, judicial
review is at an end.” (internal citations omitted)).
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appropriate.”60 In this context, the court rejected the petitioners’ argument
that CARB had not adopted the maximum reductions required by AB 32.
The court concluded that:
It is hardly surprising that the scoping plan leaves some
questions unanswered and that opinions differ as to many
complex issues inherent in the task. After reviewing the record
before us, we are satisfied that [CARB] has approached its
difficult task in conformity with the directive from the
Legislature, and that the measures that it has recommended
reflect the exercise of sound judgment based upon substantial
evidence. Further research and experience likely will suggest
modifications to the blueprint drawn in the scoping plan, but the
plan’s adoption in 2009 was in no respect arbitrary or
capricious.61
Therefore, AB 32 survived an early challenge because it was a broadly
worded statute that conferred expansive rulemaking authority to
implementing agencies. As the court noted, CARB conducted intensive
reviews of its recommendations before adopting the 2009 Scoping Plan and
these reviews also shielded CARB’s regulatory authority.62 The court
recognized that the Scoping Plan is an iterative process that will develop
over time, even if CARB had not immediately adopted as many direct
emission control mechanisms as the plaintiffs sought.63
Another battle over CARB’s cap-and-trade program was addressed in
Citizens Climate Lobby v. California Air Resources Board,64 where the petitioners,
Citizens Climate Lobby and Our Children’s Earth Foundation, challenged
CARB’s use of standardized additionality mechanisms in the offset
component of the cap-and-trade program.65 An emission reduction is
“additional” if it would not have occurred without the financial incentive

60. Id. at 72 (citing San Francisco Fire Fighters Local 798 v. City & Cnty. of San
Francisco (2006) 38 Cal.4th 653, 670).
61.

Id. at 80.

62.

Id.

63. Id. at 75 (“[C]ARB believes, based on the review of emission reduction
opportunities conducted for the scoping plan, that significant reduction
opportunities exist in the industrial sector that are more readily achieved through
market mechanisms than through direct measures.” (quoting Appendix C of the
Scoping Plan)).
64. Citizens Climate Lobby v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. CGC-12-519554, 2013 WL
861396 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 2013).
65.
258

Id. at *2.
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provided by the offset credit.66 If reductions are not additional, then the
cap-and-trade program will not reduce greenhouse gas emissions beyond
what would have occurred anyway.67
Thus, in order to determine whether a given project applying for an
offset is additional, CARB needed to determine both the level of emissions
that would have occurred in the absence of each project and whether the
project would have occurred in a counterfactual scenario where offset credits
were not available.68 Naturally, because of the inherent complexity of the
task before the agency, the court favored a deferential standard of review,
reminiscent of Irritated Residents.69
First, the court reviewed CARB’s
standardized additionality regulation de novo and found that the agency acted
within its legislative grant.70 Then the court applied a highly deferential
standard in all its other findings.71
The petitioners in Citizens Climate argued that CARB’s mechanism to
ensure additionality did not guarantee that reductions would be
additional.72 The petitioners further contended that CARB adopted circular
standards to define additionality, as opposed to making the determination
on a case-by-case basis.73 Ultimately, the court disagreed with the
petitioners because CARB’s “use of standardized mechanisms [was]
supported by evidence contained in the administrative record” and AB 32’s
broad legislative grant did not foreclose standardized additionality
mechanisms in evaluating offset projects.74
While this case raised a legitimate issue—that the cap-and-trade
program’s biggest weakness is verifying that emissions are actually offset—
the court offered support for CARB’s standardized evaluation mechanism. It
cited the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) as
evidence that a project-by-project approach is ineffective because of its

66.

Id. at *3.

67.

Id.

68.

Id. at *7.

69.

Id. at *11–12.

70.

Id. at *10, *15.

71.

Id. at *20.

72.

Id. at *34.

73. Id. CARB defined “additional” to mean a reduction is additional if it
exceeds any greenhouse gas reductions that would otherwise occur in a conservative
business-as-usual scenario. This was further defined as “the set of conditions
reasonably expected to occur within the offset project boundary in the absence of the
financial incentives provided by offset credits.” Id. This is a rather circular definition;
demonstrating the difficulty in actually ensuring that an offset will be “additional.”
74.

Id. at *20.
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administrative complexity, inevitable delay, and cost.75 The court also noted
that the project-based approach is routinely criticized for being inaccurate,
despite the fact that it is the most evolved offsetting program in the
market.76 Before reaching a legal conclusion, the court had essentially
resolved the case in favor of CARB—with apt justification:
The earliest national and international cap-and-trade systems
were created a decade ago and were not fully implemented until
years later. The history is short and the practical experience
limited. The Legislature delegates authority to agencies to
promulgate regulations using their best judgment based on the
currently available information . . . . It is not within the ambit of
the Court to decide that one methodology trumps another when
decisions are made based on extensive research, stakeholder and
public input, and fact-based analysis.77
Surviving this challenge was critical for AB 32’s success because
additionality is the crux of its offset programs. The appellate court’s
approval of CARB’s methodology will allow the agency to continue to
improve its cap-and-trade program and develop better verification
procedures.
ii. Federal Court Challenges
AB 32 has survived many legal challenges in federal court as well.
Most notably, the Rocky Mountain Farmers Union litigation raised
constitutional questions regarding the LCFS as it applied to ethanol
producers.78 The LCFS applies to any entity selling transportation fuel in
California and requires an approximately 10% average reduction in carbon
intensity of those fuels by 2020.79 In so doing, CARB mandated fuel
producers to calculate the carbon intensity of, or emissions related to,
extracting, refining, and transporting the fuel to California (called
“pathways”).80 Further, producers exceeding the mandated carbon intensity

75.

Id. at *11.

76.

Id. at *7.

77.

Id. at *11.

78. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2013), cert.
denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014), and 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014).
79. Cal. Exec. Order S-01-07 (Jan.
gov/fuels/lcfs/eos0107.pdf.

2007), available at http://www.arb.ca.

80. CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 17, § 95481.38 (2015). While the regulations do not
define the term “pathways,” the Ninth Circuit noted that when CARB assigns a
260
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threshold are required to purchase offsets in order to sell their product in
California.81 This regulation inherently has a materially different impact on
out-of-state producers than in-state producers.
The crux of the petitioners’ complaint was that the fuel standard
discriminates against out-of-state corn ethanol based solely on origin. The
petitioners asserted that CARB’s standard treated ethanol differently based
on origin despite no difference in chemical composition and that CARB’s
standard furthered no legitimate state purpose.82 The district court applied
a strict scrutiny standard and, while it reasoned that the LCFS served a
legitimate state purpose, it ruled that CARB failed to show that its policy
goals could only be achieved through discriminatory means.83 Essentially,
the district court concluded that CARB should have excluded from its
lifecycle analysis geographic-specific factors, such as transportation
emissions and production emissions (varying due to, e.g., some states
employment of an RPS while states rely on a coal-heavy generation mix),
because those factors are “inextricably intertwined with origin.”84 The
district court also ruled that the fuel standard impermissibly engaged in the
extraterritorial regulation of ethanol production.85
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals largely disagreed with the trial
court and directed it, on remand, to order the plaintiffs to prove that the fuel
standard “imposes a burden on interstate commerce that is ‘clearly
excessive’ in relation to its local benefits.”86 It noted first that if California is
to assign different carbon intensities to ethanol from different regions, there
must be “some reason, apart from their origin, to treat them differently.”87 A
regulation is not facially discriminatory simply because it affects in-state
and out-of-state interests unequally.88 The court reasoned that even though
all greenhouse gases mix in the atmosphere and “climate change risks are
widely shared,” California’s interest in reducing them is not thereby
lessened.89 Moreover, the court recognized that the LCFS uses a lifecycle
analysis to measure the carbon intensity of all fuel pathways and considers

cumulative carbon intensity value to the lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions of a fuel,
it refers to them as “pathways.” Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1081.
81.

Id. at 1080.

82.

Id. at 1077–78.

83.

Id. at 1078.

84.

Id. at 1088–89.

85.

Id. at 1077–78.

86.

Id. at 1078 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970)).

87.

Id. at 1089 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978)).

88.

Id.

89.

Id. at 1080–81 (citing Massachusetts v. E.P.A., 549 U.S. 497, 522 (2007)).
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geography only to the extent that it affects the actual emissions attributable
to a pathway90:
[I]f producers of out-of-state ethanol actually cause more GHG
emissions for each unit produced, because they use dirtier
electricity or less efficient plants, CARB can base its regulatory
treatment on these emissions. If California is to successfully
promote low-carbon-intensity fuels, countering a trend towards
increased GHG output and rising world temperatures, it cannot
ignore the real factors behind GHG emissions.91
Thus, the court held that California is “entitled to proceed” on the
understanding that global warming is induced by rising carbon emissions
because “if [California] is to have any chance to curtail GHG emissions, [it]
must be able to consider all factors that cause those emissions when it
assesses alternative fuels.”92 Accordingly, the Commerce Clause did not
require California to ignore the “real differences in carbon intensity among
out-of-state ethanol pathways . . . . These factors are not discriminatory
because they reflect the reality of assessing and attempting to limit GHG
emissions from ethanol production.”93
The Vessel Fuel Rules are another aspect of AB 32 that was opposed in
federal court. In Pacific Merchant Shipping Association v. Goldstene, the Vessel Fuel
Rules survived Commerce Clause and field preemption challenges.94 These
rules mandated that vessel operators “use cleaner marine fuels in diesel and
diesel-electric engines, propulsion engines, and auxiliary boilers” when they
“operat[e] within twenty-four nautical miles off the California coastline.”95
These rules would affect several global shipping fleets. For example,
collectively, the ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles constitute the largest
port in the United States, with over 40% of all national imports entering the
country through these ports.96
Ocean-going vessels frequenting California ports are a leading source
of air pollution in the state due to their widespread use of low-grade bunker
fuel.97 This fuel contains an average of approximately 25,000 parts per
million (“ppm”) of sulfur, along with nitrous oxide compounds and carbon
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90.

Id. at 1089.

91.

Id. at 1090.

92.

Id.

93.

Id. at 1093.

94.

Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n v. Goldstene, 639 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir. 2011).

95.

CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 13 §2299.2(b)(F) (2015).

96.

Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n, 639 F.3d at 1159.

97.

Id.
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dioxide.98 Comparatively, the diesel fuel used by trucks and other motor
vehicles emit on average just 15 ppm of sulfur.99 Moreover, California ports
were ripe for more stringent atmospheric pollutant control because 80% of
the state’s population is exposed to the emissions from oceangoing
vessels.100
From an economic perspective, addressing this issue would have
minimal impact on the American consumer.
CARB estimated that
compliance with the rules would result in approximately a six-dollar
increase per twenty-foot shipping container; or in other words, an extra 12.5
cents in the cost of a plasma television or an additional 0.14 cents for a pair
of athletic shoes.101 Nonetheless, the plaintiff, the Pacific Merchant
Shipping Association (“PMSA”), sought a declaration that, insofar as the
rules regulate “conduct seaward of California’s three-mile boundary,” the
Submerged Lands Act and the Commerce Clause preempt CARB’s
authority.102
Through the Submerged Lands Act, the United States “released to the
coastal States its rights in the submerged lands within stated limits and
confirmed its own rights therein seaward of those limits.”103 Thus, coastal
states were granted exclusive title, subject to foreign commerce, navigation,
national defense, and foreign affairs regulation by the federal government104
up to three miles seaward of their shorelines to the lands and natural
resources beneath navigable waters.105 PMSA argued that not only is the
federal interest in regulating the waters above these lands so exclusive as to
overrule state jurisdiction, but also that CARB’s rules assert the territorial
dominion of California twenty-four miles seaward, even though the Act
defined a state’s boundary at three miles seaward.106 In other words, PMSA
argued that CARB’s rules operate in fields historically operated by the

98.

Id. (citing CARB studies from 2006).

99.

Id. at 1160 (citing CARB studies from 2006).

100. Id. (“Vessel emissions constitute the single largest source of [sulfur oxide]
emissions in the state, responsible for 40% of all such emissions. Furthermore, both
NOx and SOx are precursors to fine particulate matter pollution (“PM 2.5”). It was
estimated that the vessels’ daily PM emissions represent the equivalent of
approximately 150,000 big rig trucks traveling 125 miles per day . . . emissions are
likely to be blown on-shore from beyond the geographical area actually covered by
the [rules].” (citing CARB studies from 2006)).
101.

Id. at 1176.

102.

Id. at 1161.

103.

United States v. Louisiana, 446 U.S. 253, 256 (1980).

104.

43 U.S.C. § 1314(a) (2011).

105.

Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n, 639 F.3d at 1164.

106.

Id. at 1165.
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federal government, e.g., maritime commerce, conduct at sea outside of
state boundaries, and the definition of state boundaries.107 Unfortunately
for PMSA, the court applied the “well established” presumption against
preemption in this field due to the “historic presence of state law” in the
area of air pollution.108
First, the court stated that the Submerged Lands Act expressly reserves
concurrent jurisdiction over the waters within this belt for the federal uses
discussed above.109 The court then went on to cite precedent from the
Supreme Court110 and several coastal state supreme courts111 to
demonstrate that federal law, including the Submerged Lands Act, does not
preempt CARB in this field. For example, the court cited Huron Portland
Cement Company v. City of Detroit, Michigan, where the Supreme Court “refused
to bar the prosecution of a ship owner for violating a municipal smoke
abatement provision when its vessels were docked at the city’s port even
though ‘[s]tructural alterations would be required in order to insure
compliance.’”112 The court in Huron Portland Cement Company also added,
“[l]egislation designed to free from pollution the very air that people breathe
clearly falls within the exercise of even the most traditional concept of what
is compendiously known as the police power.”113 Thus, the district court’s
denial of PMSA’s motion for summary judgment, as to its claim of implicit
field preemption under the Act, was affirmed.114
Moving to the Commerce Clause argument, the court cited the two
broad categories of state regulations that burden interstate commerce:
(1) those whose central purpose is to regulate interstate commerce or
otherwise discriminate against out-of-state interests; and (2) those that
incidentally burden commerce.115 Regulations that regulate interstate
commerce or discriminate against out of state interests are generally struck

107.

Id.at 1166.

108.

Id. at 1167.

109.

Id. at 1168.

110. See, e.g., United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 705 (1950); Skiriotes v.
Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 77 (1941).
111. See e.g., State v. Stepansky, 761 So.2d 1027, 1029–37 (Fla. 2000); State v.
Jack, 125 P.3d 311 (Alaska 2005) (following Stepansky); People v. Weeren, 607 P.2d
1279, 1281–88 (1980).
112. Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n, 639 F.3d at 1171 (quoting Huron Portland
Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, Mich., 362 U.S. 440, 441 (1960).
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113.

Id. at 1167 (quoting Huron Portland Cement, 362 U.S. at 442).

114.

Id. at 1176.

115.

Id. at 1177.
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down.116 Regulations that incidentally burden commerce are reviewed under
a balancing test, where courts will determine if the burden of the imposed
regulations outweigh their putative benefits and render the regulations
unreasonable or irrational.117
Moreover, state legislation regulating
commerce that takes place wholly outside of the state’s borders is
forbidden.118 However, “the general rule on preemption in admiralty is that
states may supplement federal admiralty law as applied to matters of local
concern, so long as state law does not actually conflict with federal law or
interfere with the uniform working of the maritime legal system.”119 Working in
this framework, the court held that the rules do not conflict with either the
Commerce Clause or the fundamental principles of maritime law.120
First, the rules do not directly regulate interstate commerce because
“the central purpose of the Vessel Fuel Rules is to protect the health and
well-being of the State’s residents from the harmful effects of the fuel used
by ocean-going vessels.”121 Moreover, the rules do not apply to commercial
activities occurring wholly outside the territorial limits of California.122
Secondly, because the rules imposed a relatively light burden on interstate
commerce, the court was permitted to balance the putative environmental
benefits from regulating the carbon intensity of vessel fuels against the
increased cost on vessels frequenting California ports.123 The court
concluded that “the exceptionally powerful state interest at issue here far
outweighs any countervailing federal interests.”124
In sum, AB 32 and its implementing regulation, the Scoping Plan, has
repeatedly withstood legal confrontations in its brief history in both state
and federal court. While the specter of explicit federal preemption remains
until Congress speaks on climate change, AB 32 has survived multiple
constitutional challenges. Moreover, California courts have approved the
main components of the Scoping Plan as well as CARB’s regulatory
jurisdiction under AB 32. CARB’s experience regulating in this field has
therefore been proven to rest on stable statutory and constitutional
authority. California’s successes, as well as those in Massachusetts, are a

116. See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth.,
476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986); Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
117.

Pac. Merch. Shipping Ass’n, 639 F.3d at 1177.

118.

Id. at 1178.

119.

Id.

120.

Id. at 1179.

121.

Id.

122.

Id.

123.

Id.

124.

Id. at 1181.
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guide for other states who are trying to design a climate change law that will
survive the inevitable legal challenges.125

III. Massachusetts
This section will examine the policy tools Massachusetts implemented
within its borders to address climate change and the legal barriers the
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) has faced as a prima facie
regulation of the interstate market for carbon emissions.126

A. Massachusetts’ GWSA and Clean Energy and Climate Plan
for 2020
Massachusetts’ Global Warming Solutions Act was codified as the
Climate Protection and Green Economy Act127 and it directed state agencies
to achieve 10% to 25% statewide greenhouse gas emission reduction below
1990 levels by 2020.128 The statute directed the Executive Office of Energy
and Environmental Affairs (“EEA”), in consultation with other agencies, to
establish regulations requiring reporting of greenhouse gas emissions,129 a
baseline assessment for 1990 emissions and a 2020 business as usual
scenario,130 and target emission reductions that must be achieved by
2020.131 The agency was required to issue an action plan and regulations
implementing these mandates.132
In late December 2010, pursuant to the legislature’s direction, EEA
released its Clean Energy and Climate Plan for 2020.133 Somewhat

125.

See infra Part B.2.

126. The states participating in this program are Massachusetts, Connecticut,
Delaware, Maine, Maryland, New Hampshire, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont.
See REGIONAL GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, http://www.rggi.org/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2014).
127. An Act Establishing The Global Warming Solutions Act, ch. 298, 2008
Mass. Acts 1154 (codified at Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21N (2013)).
128. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21N, § 3(b) (2013) (“The secretary shall . . . adopt the
following statewide greenhouse gas emissions limits: (1) a 2020 statewide emissions
limit and a plan to achieve that limit pursuant to section 4 . . . .”); id. at § 4(a) (“The
secretary shall adopt the 2020 statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit pursuant to
subsection (b) of section 3 which shall be between 10 per cent and 25 per cent below
the 1990 emissions level and a plan for achieving said reduction.”).
129.

Id. at § 5.

130.

Id. at §§ 3(b); 4(a).

131.

Id.

132.

Id.

133. Mass. Exec. Office of Energy and Envtl. Affairs, Patrick-Murray
Administration Announces Energy and Climate Plan to Reduce Greenhouse Gas
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differently than California, a state that has a wealth of natural resources that
will be directly impacted by climate change, Massachusetts framed its
climate plan largely in economic terms. First, the EEA noted that the state
imports over twenty-two billion dollars in fossil fuel resources—money that
could remain in the state.134
Moreover, EEA estimated that state
employment in the energy efficiency sector rose 65% between 2007 and
2010; highlighting a market bolstered by climate-conscious policy.135 After
discussing the excellent economic opportunity before the commonwealth,136
the EEA addressed the hazardous environmental impacts global warming
will have on Massachusetts’ climate, further demonstrating the impetus for
the commonwealth’s action.137
EEA’s plan employs an “integrated portfolio of policies” that is divided
into five categories where new climate change regulation can be integrated
with existing policy to reduce emissions138: buildings, electricity supply,
transportation, non-energy emissions, and cross-cutting policies.139 While
EEA’s emission reduction goal is at 18%, ideally, it is estimating a roughly

Emissions by 25 percent by 2020 (Dec. 29, 2010), http://www.mass.gov/eea/pr-prep2/pr-2010/press-release-re-clean-energy-and-climate-plan.html.
134. IAN A. BOWELS, MASS. EXEC. OFFICE OF ENERGY AND ENVTL. AFFAIRS,
MASSACHUSETTS CLEAN ENERGY AND CLIMATE PLAN FOR 2020, at 2 (2010), available at
http://www.mass.gov/eea/docs/eea/energy/2020-clean-energy-plan.pdf
[hereinafter
Mass. 2020 Clean Energy & Climate Plan] (“All of [Massachusetts’] fossil-based
energy resources—oil, natural gas, and coal—are derived from other regions of the
country . . . and other parts of the world, many of them unstable or hostile to the
United States . . . all spending on fossil fuel energy . . . flows out of state and fails to
provide income to in-state businesses or employees.”).
135. Id. at 1 (“Massachusetts launched the most aggressive energy efficiency
program in the country, with estimated savings of over $6 billion for residential,
municipal, industrial, and commercial customers and 4,500 jobs projected.”); id.
(“Between 2007 and the end of 2010 . . . jobs in solar manufacturing, installation, and
services [tripled] – while installed wind energy increased 10-fold.”).
136. Id. at 5–6 (“Through both direct and indirect impacts, we estimate that
these policies will create 36,000 jobs in Massachusetts in 2020, including about
13,000 via transportation policies and 23,000 via policies to improve efficiency of
energy use in buildings.”).
137. Id. at 9–11 (e.g., summer temperatures would “feel like the current
summer climate of the Carolinas,” rainfall would increase by 12% to 30%, coastal
lands would be subject to increased erosion, and the possibility of an outbreak of a
water-borne disease would also increase.).
138.

Id. at 13.

139.

Id. at 80.
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27% emission reduction by 2020, procured from the aforementioned
sectors.140
1. Buildings
Buildings are of particular focus for Massachusetts because they
consume over 50% of the energy used in the commonwealth, primarily from
natural gas heating and heating oils, as well as from electricity for air
conditioning, lighting, ventilation, appliances, and industrial equipment.141
To achieve reductions in this arena, EEA proposed performance based
energy codes to incentivize energy efficiency in new construction,142 as well
as “deep” building retrofitting.143 In addition, EEA proposed eventual widescale adoption of “residential building energy labeling that allows apples-toapples comparisons of home energy performance in much the same way
that miles per gallon (“MPG”) ratings allow fuel efficiency comparisons of
cars and light trucks.”144 The EEA also included a policy framework for solar
thermal water and space heating in both residential and commercial
buildings.145
2. Electricity Supply
EEA’s policy proposals in the electricity supply sector sought to build
on the existing RPS146 and the commonwealth’s participation in RGGI147 by
implementing stricter power plant rules, increasing hydroelectric energy

140. EEA estimates that of the approximately 27% in emission reductions,
9.8% will come from buildings, 7.7% from electricity supply, 7.6% from transportation,
and 2% from non-energy sources. Id. at 92.
141.

Id. at 14.

142.

Id. at 23.

143. Id. at 26 (e.g., rebates for retrofits with higher levels of insulation, air
leakage reduction, and thermally efficient windows).
144.

Id. at 16.

145. Id. at 29 (“Hot water and space heating are large energy users that do not
require very high grade fuels (unlike motor vehicles for example). This makes them
excellent candidates for active solar heating, which has no fuel expense and can
provide significant heating from a small roof, wall or ground-mounted system.”).
146. Id. at 40 (“Over the period from 2010 to 2020, the Massachusetts RPS
classes will stimulate $360 million annual investment, or $3.9 billion in cumulative
investment in clean power generation that would not have occurred on its own. This
is expected to create approximately 900 full-time construction jobs throughout that
period.”).
147. Id. at 42 (“Over $120 million in auction proceeds has been invested in
energy efficiency projects across [Massachusetts] since 2009 . . . .”).
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imports from Canada, and establishing a clean energy performance standard
(“CPS”).148 Massachusetts expects to bring its older coal-fired power plants
offline in response to EPA’s more stringent power plant rules.149 EEA
estimates that Massachusetts could achieve a net reduction of 1.2 million
metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent150 in 2020 if two of its aging coal
plants were replaced by natural gas-fired power plants.151 The CPS is a
proposed “market-based framework” that incentivizes performance
standards of power plants supplying Massachusetts’ electricity.152 In order
to do so, EEA proposes a doubling of hydroelectric power imports,
increasing capacity from regional nuclear plants, and stimulating power
generation technology evolution.153
3. Transportation
In the transportation sector, Massachusetts will improve vehicle
efficiency, reduce vehicle miles traveled, and bolster the commonwealth’s
existing policy to reduce the carbon intensity of vehicle fuel sold in the
commonwealth.154 Currently, Massachusetts is in conformance with EPA’s
27.5-MPG standard and expects to reach the 35.5-MPG goal by 2016.
Moreover, Massachusetts will adopt California’s MPG and greenhouse gas
emission standards for vehicle fuels (expected to be more stringent than the
federal standard) when they are implemented for model 2017 to 2020
vehicles.155 In conjunction with the Clean Energy Biofuels Act, the EEA
plans on implementing an LCFS similar to California’s standards.156 To
reduce the amount of vehicle miles traveled, Massachusetts is piloting a
“pay as you drive” automobile insurance program that converts a large fixed
annual premium into a variable cost based on miles traveled.157 With
transportation expected to account for about 40% of total greenhouse gas

148.

Id. at 38–39.

149.

Id. at 44.

150. Carbon dioxide equivalent, or “CO2e,” is defined as “the amount of carbon
dioxide by weight that would produce the same global warming impact as a given weight
of another greenhouse gas . . . .” CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38505(c) (West 2014).
151.

Mass. 2020 Clean Energy & Climate Plan, supra note 134, at 44.

152. Id. at 47 (“[CPS] applies an output-based performance standard to either
portfolios of retail electricity sellers or to generators in terms of tons of pollution per
megawatt-hour of electricity.”).
153.

Id.

154.

Id. at 49–51.

155.

Id. at 53.

156.

Id. at 57.

157.

Id. at 61.
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emissions in Massachusetts by 2020, EEA is confident that incentivizing a
reduction in vehicle miles traveled will result in extensive economic158 and
public health benefits.159 EEA also proposed to reduce sprawl and promote
“smart growth”160 by highlighting the need to coordinate transportation
infrastructure and land use planning.161
4. Non-Energy Emissions
The non-energy emissions sector accounts for roughly 7% of
Massachusetts’ greenhouse gas emissions. To curb these largely industrial
pollutants, EEA proposed finding substitutes for high global warming
potential refrigerants and emission reduction from disposal of plastic
waste.162 EEA is particularly concerned about refrigerants used in motor
vehicle air conditioning and industrial sources, as well as the need to retrofit
these sources of greenhouse emissions to reduce leakage.163 Additionally,
EEA estimates that diversion of plastic from the waste stream into recycled
goods will yield cumulative savings between sixty-nine and ninety-two
million dollars from 2009 to 2020 while cutting emissions generated by
plastic disposal.164
5. Cross-Cutting Policies
Finally, EEA is developing a plan to implement its statutory mandate
to “consider reasonably foreseeable climate change impacts, including
additional [greenhouse] gas emissions” when reviewing and issuing permits,

158. Id. at 62 (“A nationwide study by the Brookings Institution found that [pay
as you drive] insurance would reduce [vehicle miles traveled] by [eight] percent.”).
An 8% reduction in vehicle miles traveled would result in nearly 2% reduction of
statewide greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. Id.
159. Id. (“In the middle policy option, there would be an estimate reduction in
crashes of 11,000, 7,000 fewer injuries, and 36 fewer fatalities, yielding $420 million
in total benefits, part of which would accrue to drivers in lower insurance rates.”).
160. “Smart growth” is compact mixed-use development that focuses on
increased population density, building efficiency, and reducing vehicle miles
traveled. Id. at 68.
161. Id. (“Large transportation cost reductions can be expected for residents
and business due to reduced vehicle ownership and fuel consumption. High-density
mixed-use development will increase building efficiency and make district energy
and combined heat and power more feasible.”).
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162.

Id. at 71–72.

163.

Id. at 73–76.

164.

Id. at 79.
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licenses, and other administrative approvals or decisions.165 This “crosscutting” policy will expand the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act166
and embed climate change adaptation into municipal planning.167
Moreover, EEA will also expand Massachusetts’ existing “Leading by
Example” program that “works to lower costs and reduce environmental
impacts” of all executive agencies, quasi-public authorities, and the twentynine public institutions of higher education in the commonwealth.168
In sum, Massachusetts’ multi-sector approach resembles CARB’s
Scoping Plan in many ways. Both plans are governed by short and broadly
written statutes that empower state agencies to make expansive rules that
have far-reaching economic impacts. Moreover, both states recognize the
dire need to restrict carbon emissions from their energy and transportation
industries. However, Massachusetts frames its climate action plan in more
explicit economic terms than California and often emphasizes the
employment opportunities that EEA’s plans will create. Regardless of their
differences, both plans serve as models for other states.

B. Other Laws Addressing Global Warming in Massachusetts
1. Clean Energy Biofuels Act of 2008
Biofuels are substitutes for fossil fuels and are derived from organic
matter such as corn, soy, switchgrass, agricultural waste, wood, and waste
vegetable oil.169 Cellulosic biofuels refer to gasoline substitutes made from
the fibrous matter of feedstocks (i.e., cellulose, hemicellulose, or lignin).170
The advantages of cellulosic biofuels over fossil fuels become apparent upon
analyzing the lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions of both fuels. Under the Act,
these emissions are an aggregate of direct and “significant” indirect
emissions, which relate to feedstock generation, extraction, distribution, and
delivery where the mass values of all greenhouse gas emissions therefrom are
adjusted to account for their relative global warming potential.171

165.

Id. at 87 (see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21N, § 7 (2013)).

166.

Id. at 81.

167.

Id. at 85–86.

168.

Id. at 83 (Dec. 29, 2010).

169. Ken Kimmel & Laurie Burt, Massachusetts Takes on Climate Change, 27 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 295, 307 (2009).
170.

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 64A, § 1 (2013).

171. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 64A, § 1 (“‘Lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions’ [are]
the aggregate quantity of greenhouse gas emissions, including direct emissions and
significant indirect emissions such as significant emissions from and use changes, as
determined by the department in consultation with the department of environmental
protection and the executive office of energy and environmental affairs, related to the
271

West

Northwest, Vol. 21, No. 2, Summer 2015

While replacing fossil fuels with bioenergy does not by itself reduce
carbon emissions, biofuels can produce net climate benefits when the
feedstock captures more carbon while it is growing than would otherwise be
captured.172 To take advantage of these benefits, Massachusetts defined
“eligible cellulosic biofuel” as one that “yields at least a 60 per cent lifecycle
greenhouse gas emissions relative to the average lifecycle greenhouse gas
emissions petroleum based fuel sold in 2005.”173 In doing so, Massachusetts
was the first state in the country to give preferential tax treatment to
companies that develop gasoline substitutes from the cellulosic matter of
feedstocks to support non-corn-based ethanol fuels.174
Through this legislation, Massachusetts also adopted a LCFS—one that
was in exact conformity with California’s standard. Under the Act, a LCFS is
defined as “a legal requirement that the average lifecycle greenhouse gas
emissions attributable to use of energy in an economic sector are equal to or
below a specified numeric level . . . such as the requirement contained in
California Executive Order S-1-07.”175 The Act also directed EEA to develop
and enter into (“to the extent possible”) an agreement with RGGI states that
implements a region-wide LCFS.176
Ultimately, the commonwealth is primarily relying on the development
of a LCFS, supported by cellulosic biofuel, to obtain reductions in one of its
biggest sources of greenhouse gas emissions—the transportation sector.177
The Clean Energy Biofuels Act gave EEA statutory authority to include a LCFS

full fuel lifecycle, including all stages of fuel and feedstock production and
distribution, from feedstock generation or extraction through the distribution and
delivery and use of the finished fuel to the ultimate consumer, where the mass
values for all greenhouse gases are adjusted to account for their relative global
warming potential.”).
172. Timothy D. Searchinger et al., Fixing a Critical Climate Accounting Error, 326
SCI. 527, 528 (2009) (“Bioenergy . . . reduces greenhouse emissions only if the growth
and harvesting of the biomass for energy captures carbon above and beyond what
would be sequestered anyway and thereby offsets emissions from energy use.”).
173. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 64A, § 1. Similarly, the federal government also
takes these net lifecycle emissions benefits into account and defines “advanced”
biofuels in the Clean Air Act as a “renewable fuel, other than ethanol derived from
corn starch, that has lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions . . . that are at least 50
percent less than baseline lifecycle greenhouse gas emissions [of fossil fuels].” See
42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(B)(i) (2012).
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174.

Kimmel & Burt, supra note 169.

175.

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94, § 295G1/2(1) (2013).

176.

An Act Relative to Clean Energy Biofuels, ch. 206, 2008 Mass. Acts 968.

177.

See Mass. 2020 Clean Energy & Climate Plan, supra note 134, at 52.
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that favors cellulosic biofuels in the commonwealth’s Clean Energy Plan.178
Moreover, the Act allows Massachusetts to fulfill the federal government’s
renewable fuel and cellulosic biofuel directives.179 Thus, the Act is integral to
the transportation component of Massachusetts’ overall climate change
regulation framework.
2. Green Jobs Act of 2008
Massachusetts passed the Green Jobs Act in 2008 to directly capitalize
on the economic opportunity created by addressing climate change. 180 One
of the goals of the statute was to promote job creation in the clean energy
sector,181 specifically jobs in energy efficiency.182 The commonwealth had
good reason to do so as well; according to a University of Massachusetts,
Amherst study,183 clean energy spending produces more jobs at all pay
levels than the fossil fuel industry.184 In order to actually create those jobs,
however, the commonwealth needed to attract green business to
Massachusetts, as well as train its existing workforce to serve this
burgeoning industry.
Accordingly, the Act established the Massachusetts Clean Energy
Technology Center185 (“Center”) to serve as the commonwealth’s lead
regulatory agency in fostering the clean energy economy.186 To assist in
financing the Center, the Green Jobs Act also established the Massachusetts

178.

See id. at 51.

179.

See id. at 51–52.

180. An Act Relative to Green Jobs in the Commonwealth, ch. 307, 2008 Mass.
Acts 1371.
181.

Id.

182. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23J, § 1 (2013); see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23J, §§
2(a)(i)–(xi) (“The [Massachusetts Clean Energy Center] shall promote and advance
the commonwealth’s public interests by: (i) acting as the commonwealth’s lead
agency . . . in the promotion and development of jobs in the clean energy sector . . .
(iii) stimulating the creation and development of new clean energy ventures that will
form the foundation of a strong clean energy industry sector or cluster in the
commonwealth . . . .”).
183. Prepared under commission from the Natural Resources Defense Council
and Green for All.
184. ROBERT POLLIN ET AL., DEP’T OF ECON. & POLITICAL ECON. RESEARCH INST., UNIV.
MASS., AMHERST, GREEN PROSPERITY: HOW CLEAN-ENERGY CAN FIGHT POVERTY AND RAISE
LIVING STANDARDS IN THE UNITED STATES 10, 12 (2009), available at http://docs.nrdc.org/
globalWarming/files/glo_09062504a.pdf.
OF

185.

A department under EEA. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23J, § 2(a).

186.

Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23J, § 2(a).
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Alternative and Clean Energy Investment Trust Fund (“Fund”).187 Moreover,
the Center has regulatory authority to enter into agreements with public or
private clean energy entities to further research and development in clean
energy jobs, aid in the promotion of environmental protection, and
collaborate with government and business to foster clean energy
investment.188 As of 2014, the Center has invested nine million dollars into
the sixteen companies in its portfolio, which have raised a total of $535
million in additional investment from private sources.189
Generally, the Center has been successful in bringing investment
dollars and jobs to Massachusetts’ clean energy sector. For example, clean
energy businesses in Massachusetts have added a total of 28,000 workers to
their payrolls since 2010—a 47% increase.190 Over 1,000 new businesses
were established in Massachusetts’ clean energy sector between 2011 and
2014.191 Clean energy employment statewide grew over 10% between 2013
and 2014.192 Renewable energy workers account for nearly 21,000 jobs in
Massachusetts and employers expect to add about 3,800 new employees
between 2014 and 2015—representing the fastest growth rate of any
technology area in the commonwealth at a rate of 18%.193 Furthermore,
Massachusetts predicted it would add renewable energy jobs at a rate of
13.3% from 2014 to 2015.194 In comparison, statewide overall job growth

187. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 10, § 35FF(a) (2013); see also Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 10, §
35FF(c) (the fund shall advance the following public purposes: “(1) to stimulate
increased financing for the expansion of state-of-the-art clean energy research and
development facilities by leveraging private financing and providing financing related
thereto including, without limitation, financing for the construction or expansion of
such facilities; (2) to provide grants to state educational institutions to develop a
curriculum relative to clean energy and clean energy technology; (3) to make targeted
investments in clean energy research and to promote manufacturing activities for
new or existing advanced clean energy technologies; (4) to make matching grants to
universities, colleges, public instrumentalities, companies and other entities to
induce the federal government, industry and other grant-funding sources to fund the
expansion of research and development in clean energy”).
188. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23J, § 3(a)(14). For a full description of the Center’s
authority, see id. at §§ 3(a)(1)–(30).
189. MASS. CLEAN ENERGY CTR., MASSACHUSETTS CLEAN ENERGY INDUSTRY REPORT
2014, at 38 (2014), available at http://images.masscec.com/reports/Web%20Optimized%
202014%20Report%20Final.pdf.

274

190.

Id. at 1.

191.

Id. at 24.

192.

Id. at 25.

193.

Id. at 14.

194.

Id. at 1.
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projections in the same period are less than 2%.195 This growth is derived
primarily from the energy efficiency, renewable energy, and associated
financial and legal service industries.196
The Green Jobs Act has proven fruitful in demonstrating the viability of
environmentally conscious economic policies.
Even in the face of
diminished federal subsidies, the renewable energy and energy efficiency
markets continue to flourish in Massachusetts. Preparing its workforce for a
transition to a clean energy economy will prove critical for Massachusetts.
While the rest of the national economy undergoes the same transition,
Massachusetts’ economy will be primed to accommodate green business
and its policymakers will understand what approaches are most effective at
both addressing climate change and driving economic growth.
3. The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
RGGI is a regional cap-and-trade program administered by nine
Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states, including Massachusetts. RGGI’s
“CO2 Budget Trading Program” sets a decreasing carbon emission cap and
regulates emissions from fossil fuel power plants with a capacity of twentyfive megawatts or greater located in RGGI states.197
The current
programmatic emissions budget is ninety-one million tons of carbon
dioxide, divided among each state in rough proportion to emitting
sources.198
Each state issues carbon allowances through their own RGGI
implementing regulations.199 Massachusetts has twenty-seven regulated
sources, constituting 16% of RGGI’s carbon dioxide budget.200 Similar to
California’s cap-and-trade system, Massachusetts and the other RGGI states
rely on category-specific, or standardized, additionality measurements.
Currently, there are five categories of offsetting projects that are eligible

195.

Id.

196.

Id. at 13–14.

197.

REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, OVERVIEW OF RGGI CO2 BUDGET TRADING
PROGRAM 2 (2007), http://www.rggi.org/docs/program_summary_10_07.pdf.
198. Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI States Make Major Cuts to
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Power Plants (Jan. 13, 2014), http://www.rggi.org/
docs/PressReleases/PR011314_AuctionNotice23.pdf.
199. Regulated Sources, RGGI.ORG (last visited Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.rggi.org/
design/overview/regulated_sources. Massachusetts’ regulations implementing RGGI
are found at 225 MASS. CODE. REGS. §13.01 (2013) et seq. and 310 MASS. CODE. REGS. §
7.00 (2013) et seq.
200. REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, RGGI REGION – STATE SNAPSHOTS,
http://www.rggi.org/docs/RGGI_Snapshots_Region.pdf.
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allowances under RGGI, for example, carbon sequestration in American
forest preservation projects.201
Offset allowances are distributed through quarterly auctions.202 They
are tracked using an online platform that enables the public to view and
download reports of program data and allowance activity.203 Allowances are
allocated and transferred on the platform and offset projects can be
registered on it as well.204 The largely positive first RGGI program review was
published on February 7, 2013, and concluded that there were several
opportunities to build on RGGI’s success.205 However, despite RGGI’s
largely positive beginnings, constitutional questions still linger around the
regional cap-and-trade program. The following section examines possible
constitutional issues that several legal scholars have raised in the years
following RGGI’s enactment.
i. Compact Clause Challenges
Under the Compact Clause in Article I of the Constitution, “no state
shall, without the consent of Congress . . . enter into any agreement or
compact with any other state . . . .” Interpreting this language literally, RGGI
is an unconstitutional agreement among the states because they never
sought congressional approval.
However, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the clause differently than the literal language of the
provision.206 The clause is now read to prohibit “the formation of any
combination tending to increase the political power in the states, which may
encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States.”207

201. REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, FACT SHEET: RGGI OFFSETS,
http://www.rggi.org/docs/Documents/RGGI_Offsets_FactSheet.pdf.
Other eligible
offsetting projects include landfill methane capture and destruction, reduction in
emissions of sulfur hexafluoride in the electric power sector, reduction or avoidance
of end-use combustion of fossil fuels due to increased energy efficiency in the
building sector, and avoided methane emissions from agricultural manure
management operations.
202. REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, FACT SHEET: RGGI CO2 ALLOWANCE
AUCTIONS, http://www.rggi.org/docs/Documents/RGGI_Auctions_FactSheet.pdf.
203. REG’L GREENHOUSE GAS INITIATIVE, FACT SHEET: RGGI CO2 ALLOWANCE
TRACKING SYSTEM, http://www.rggi.org/docs/Documents/RGGI_COATS_FactSheet.pdf.
204.

Id.

205. Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI States Propose Lowering Regional
CO2 Emissions Cap 45% (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.rggi.org/docs/PressReleases/
PR130207_ModelRule.pdf.
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In other words, agreements that do not encroach upon federal sovereignty
do not require Congressional consent.208
One scholar recently considered and dismissed the possibility of a
viable Compact Clause challenge to RGGI.209 Applying Virginia v. Tennessee to
RGGI, Professor Funk noted, “RGGI does not limit the federal government’s
authority to regulate [carbon dioxide] in any way it sees fit.”210 Moreover, no
state has delegated any of its sovereign powers to RGGI, Inc., the
administrative body that implements each states’ respective RGGI laws.211
In fact, all of RGGI’s powers stem solely from individual states’ laws, which
are “nothing more than reciprocal legislation” with no capacity to bind other
member states.212 RGGI only limits greenhouse gas emissions of electricity
generators within each member states’ borders and does not interfere with
any existing federal regulatory scheme. Professor Funk concluded: “It
appears that the Compact Clause, like the Non-Delegation Doctrine, has
become a restriction in theory, but in practice the restriction rarely
applies.”213 Thus, in light of RGGI’s inability to legally bind its constituents,
the member states would likely withstand a Compact Clause challenge.
ii. Federal Preemption Challenges
RGGI may be subject to two possible preemption arguments: field and
conflict preemption.
The Supreme Court has articulated that field
preemption exists when:
[I]n the absence of explicit statutory language, state law . . .
regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal
Government to occupy exclusively. Such an intent may be
inferred from a “scheme of federal regulation . . . so pervasive as
to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the States to supplement it,” or where an Act of Congress
“touch[es] a field in which the federal interest is so dominant

208. Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S.
159, 175 (1985).
209. William Funk, Constitutional Implications of Regional CO2 Cap-and-Trade
Programs: The Northeast Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative as a Case in Point, 27 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 353, 358–62 (2009).
210.

Id. at 360.

211.

Id.

212.

Id.

213.

Funk, supra notes 209, at 361.
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that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the same subject.”214
However, where “the field which Congress is said to have preempted
includes areas that have been traditionally occupied by the States,
congressional intent to supersede state laws must be clear and manifest.”215
Today, the field preemption argument is easily defeated. However, if
EPA continues to increase its regulation of greenhouse gas emissions, the
field preemption argument against interstate cap-and-trade programs may
strengthen considerably. For RGGI to be preempted under a field
preemption theory, Congress must speak to the issue so thoroughly as “to
make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to
supplement it.”216 In this context, only one federal law comes to mind—the
Clean Air Act. However, the Clean Air Act only tangentially discusses
greenhouse gas emission regulation217 and vests regulatory authority with
the states.218 Thus, Congress has not clearly spoken about the field of
interstate greenhouse gas emission as to preempt states from
supplementing what little federal regulation currently exists.
Conflict preemption is a better argument against RGGI, but it would
likely fail in court as well. This type of preemption exists when Congress

214. English v. General Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990) (quoting Rice v. Santa
Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
215. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (citing Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430
U.S. 519, 525 (1977), Rice, 331 U.S. at 230).
216.

Id.

217. While there is no federal global warming solutions act, the Supreme
Court has held that Congress delegated the authority to regulate greenhouse gas
emissions to EPA. See, e.g., American Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527,
2538–39 (2011) (“The Clean Air Act is no less an exercise of the Legislature’s
considered judgment concerning air pollution regulation because it permits
emissions until EPA acts. The critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the
decision whether and how to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions from power
plants . . . . The Clean Air Act entrusts such complex balancing to EPA in the first
instance [of decision-making], in combination with state regulators.” (internal
quotations omitted)).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) (2012) (“The Congress finds that air pollution
prevention . . . and air pollution control at its source is the primary responsibility of
States and local governments . . . .”); see also Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. S. Coast Air Quality
Mgmt. Dist., 541 U.S. 246, 260 (2004) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7401(a)(3) and Huron
Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 442 (1960) (“Legislation designed to
free from pollution the very air that people breathe clearly falls within the exercise of
even the most traditional concept of what is compendiously known as the police
power.”)).
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intends federal law to exclusively occupy a given field, when it is impossible
for a private party to comply with both state and federal law, and when the
challenged state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.”219 In light of the
fact that greenhouse gas regulation is virtually absent from the Clean Air
Act, it is highly unlikely that Congress intended to completely preempt state
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, compliance with state
greenhouse gas emission regulations could actually help states satisfy their
requirements under the Clean Air Act—dispelling the notion that a private
citizen could not comply with both state and federal greenhouse gas
emission laws.220

IV. Elements of an Effective Greenhouse Gas Regulation
Framework
A successful climate change law should consider the experiences of
California and Massachusetts. Both states have broadly worded statutes
that use a cross-sector approach; a renewable portfolio standard that
includes all electric power generators; and a statewide cap-and-trade
program or joint program with other states.
Furthermore, state
policymakers should incorporate the early lessons learned in California and
Massachusetts when adopting climate change regulations in their states.
Developing an understanding of how legal challenges to climate change
regulation were overcome in other states is critical for policymakers to
shape flexible regulation that can withstand potential legal challenges.

A. Statutory Design
The first component of an effective climate change regulation statute
is a broad delegation of lawmaking authority. In Massachusetts and
California, such a delegation enabled important policy evolutions in
greenhouse gas regulation and proved successful in shielding climate
change regulation in California from legal challenge. Both states used short
statutory language that delegated statutory authority in this field to public
resource agencies. For example, in Massachusetts, the legislature directed

219. Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372–73 (2000)
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
220. For a brief discussion about a conflict preemption challenge under the
Supreme Court’s decision in American Insurance Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396
(2003) (holding that state law can be preempted by executive branch policy alone),
see Shelley Welton, State Dynamism, Federal Constraints: Possible Constitutional Hurdles to
Cross-Border Cap-and-Trade, 27 NAT. RES. & ENV’T 36, 38–39 (2012) (rejecting argument
that an interstate cap-and-trade program could conflict with the executive branch’s
international negotiating stance on climate change).
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the EEA to simply set a greenhouse gas emission reduction target and issue
a plan to implement that reduction.221 Similarly, the California legislature
directed CARB to adopt regulations that “achieve the maximum
technologically feasible and cost-effective greenhouse gas emission
reductions.”222
Legislative grants like these have encouraged the development of
climate change plans in both states because the broad authority provides
agencies with the flexibility to quickly implement much-needed regulation,
while also reviewing and building upon their early experiences. For
example, the Massachusetts’ legislature directed the EEA to create a policy
plan with essentially no parameters, except that the plan must implement a
greenhouse gas emission reduction target chosen by the agency. This
allowed interagency coordination within the commonwealth in developing a
plan that addresses several sectors of the Massachusetts economy.
Moreover, the Massachusetts Global Warming Solutions Act was an
outgrowth of existing policy designed to begin a transition to a clean energy
economy.223 The inherent complexity and unfamiliarity of climate change to
policymakers means iterative policy development is necessary because it
creates an opportunity for policymakers to learn from past mistakes and
adapt to the evolving science of climate change. CARB’s Scoping Plan is an
excellent example of an agency developing and consolidating institutional
knowledge about climate change regulation. The entire state builds
expertise as a result of one agency’s iterative experience in regulating this
otherwise unregulated field. Empowering agencies to push forward climate
change regulation gives legislators a bird’s-eye view of where such
regulation is going. With this perspective in mind, lawmakers should arm
agencies with broad statutory tools to address climate change.
A broad grant of statutory authority to the regulating agency also
proved successful in protecting California’s Global Warming Solutions Act
from multiple legal challenges. Fossil-fuel interests will undoubtedly
challenge any climate change regulation in court, thus it would be wise for
state legislators to preemptively protect agency discretion by granting
agencies quasi-legislative authority under climate change statutes. Two
cases challenging AB 32 are characteristic examples of how broad statutory
authority protects agency discretion in choosing one regulatory mechanism
over another. First, in Irritated Residents, the California appellate court

221.

See generally Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 21N (2013).

222.

CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562 (West 2014).

223. For example, the Clean Jobs Act of 2008 established a center and a trust
fund that serve as the commonwealth’s guide to the transition to a clean energy
economy. See supra, note 185. This policy tool fosters private investment in clean
energy, thereby spurring technology innovation and giving policymakers new
mechanisms to address climate change.
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concluded that rules implemented under AB 32 have the “dignity of statutes”
because CARB was granted “quasi-legislative” rulemaking power.224 Second,
in Citizen’s Climate Lobby, the California trial court noted that AB 32’s broad
legislative grant enabled CARB to adopt standardized protocols for
measuring additionality in its cap-and-trade program, even though no other
comparable cap-and-trade program in the world used this strategy.225 These
holdings allow CARB to experiment with different regulatory strategies
without fear of adverse litigation because the broad grant of power afforded
to the agency pressures courts to defer to CARB’s reasoning. California
courts appear even more deferential to the agency’s expertise in this field
than what is normally expected because they recognize that the legislature
has limited their standard of review and the agencies themselves are still
trying to figure out which policy approaches best address climate change.
This deference enables policy evolution, which will eventually lead to more
effective climate change regulation in the future.
Of course, there are drawbacks to yielding rulemaking authority to an
agency. State legislatures would be granting authority to potentially
influence the entire economy. It may be inappropriate to completely defer
such far-reaching decision-making power to unelected individuals. Further,
if some of these agencies are “captured” by powerful stakeholders, for
example, utility companies, climate change regulation could be hijacked and
become a secondary objective. Conversely, deferring statutory authority to
an agency acknowledges the fact that agencies have more technical
expertise than legislatures. In comparison to the lobbying efforts necessary
to influence legislators, small stakeholders wielding only minor political
influence have a better chance at affecting agency rules because the
rulemaking process is more transparent and bound by enforceable
procedural rules. Ultimately, both government bodies will have a role to
play. Expert agencies will be better equipped to address climate change
when they are given the freedom to be creative and iterative. State
legislatures can empower an agency by delegating broad lawmaking
authority, allowing the agency to learn from its experiences.
An effective climate change statutory regime must be broadly written
in another sense as well. The statute must also include a cross-sector
approach to minimizing greenhouse gas emissions. Both California and
Massachusetts wisely allowed their agencies to regulate all major
greenhouse gas emitters in their respective economies. Both states’ climate
action plans include policies for individual sectors, such as agriculture,
energy efficiency, transportation, marine vessels and ports, and energy

224. Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 65, 71
(Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
225. Citizens Climate Lobby v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. CGC-12-519554, 2013 WL
861396, at *6 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 2013).
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generation. Massachusetts’ plan even adds consideration of climatic
impacts to its environmental policy act. A cross-sector approach to seeking
emissions reductions is important because climate change has systematic
consequences.
The most important economic sectors to address are energy
generation and transportation. While addressing other sectors may depend
on the specific situation of a given state, energy generation and
transportation raises issues common to all states. Transitioning these two
sectors to mainly renewable fuels can be achieved through an RPS and an
LCFS. Pushing utilities and vehicle manufacturers to evolve their energy mix
is best achieved by requiring them to reach certain quotas of purchased
renewable energy. All states should adopt renewable portfolio standards
that direct energy utilities to purchase incrementally increasing amounts of
renewable energy over time. Both California and Massachusetts are already
considering increasing their renewable energy goals because their initial
efforts at establishing renewable portfolio standards have proven both
viable and successful. California’s LCFS is a model for ten other states,
including Massachusetts, expanding the effect of California’s relatively
stringent transportation fuel rules to nearly 25% of the American vehicle
market.226 Establishing fuel standards in both the energy and transportation
sectors is crucial to regulating greenhouse gas emissions because they
significantly contribute to climate change.
Major climatic variation will impact all natural resources, which
inherently underlie all phases of a state’s economy. Moreover, every sector
of a state’s economy contributes to climate change, even if those emissions
disproportionately come from the transportation and energy generation
sectors. Therefore, climate change regulation must take a top-down
approach because the nature of climate change and its latent consequences
are such that all phases of society are impacted by regulation, or lack
thereof.

B. Cap-and-Trade Program
States must look to a market based compliance mechanism to achieve
greenhouse gas emission reductions. California and Massachusetts have
both adopted cap-and-trade programs as alternatives to direct taxation of
emissions. Other states should either create or join existing cap-and-trade
programs because this method of carbon regulation is the most politically
palatable method of limiting greenhouse gas emissions. The experiences of
California and Massachusetts demonstrate that regulating greenhouse gas

226. AIR RES. BD. & CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, FIRST UPDATE TO THE CLIMATE
CHANGE SCOPING PLAN 49 (2014), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/scopingplan/
2013_update/first_update_climate_change_scoping_plan.pdf.
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emissions via a cap-and-trade program is politically viable, despite the
logistical burdens presented by cap-and-trade.
Massachusetts and its neighboring northeastern states provide a great
example of a successful, though nascent, regional cap-and-trade model.
RGGI distributes offset allowances to industries in member states through
an online platform that enables the public to view and download reports of
program data and allowance activity.227
Through this program,
Massachusetts has begun to target twenty-seven major emitters of
greenhouse gas emissions in its state, which together constitute 16% of
RGGI’s total carbon budget.228
Smaller states should share expertise and support to begin regulating
greenhouse gas emissions within their geographic regions, using RGGI as a
model. Larger states can look to California’s statewide cap-and-trade
program. Capping regional emissions from a handful of states is likely more
feasible when a state with the amount of California’s emissions is not
involved. By itself, California’s greenhouse gas program is the second
largest such program in the world and regulates several greenhouse gas
emission sources in California beyond what is statutorily required by AB
32.229
These fledgling emissions trading mechanisms are an important first
step in regulating greenhouse gas emissions; however, both programs have
also drawn criticism. Notably, neither state adopted any direct tax on
greenhouse gas emissions as a means of regulating such emissions. In
California, CARB completely rejected a carbon tax as a market based
compliance mechanism and provided meaningful evidence supporting this
decision only after being directed to by a trial court.230 In place of a carbon
tax, Massachusetts enacted extensive economic incentives for its economy
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.231 Its participation in RGGI also
indicates the commonwealth’s preference against direct taxation as a
method of regulating greenhouse gas emissions. Obviously, both states
have avoided direct taxation because it is a politically unpalatable method
of regulating greenhouse gas emissions. This is unfortunate because
directly taxing emissions appears on its face to be an intuitively simpler
method of curtailing emissions. If entities are specifically taxed, they are

227. See Ne. Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S.
159, 175 (1985).
228. See Reg’l Greenhouse Gas Initiative, RGGI States Propose Lowering
Regional CO2 Emissions Cap 45% (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.rggi.org/docs/
PressReleases/PR130207_ModelRule.pdf.
229.

AIR RES. BD. & CAL. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, supra note 226 at 86.

230. Ass’n of Irritated Residents v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 143 Cal. Rptr. 3d 65, 71
(Cal. Ct. App. 2012).
231.

See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 23J (2013) et seq.
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compelled to minimize the act resulting in higher taxes. Instead both states
must now deal with the Achilles’ heel of cap-and-trade programs—
measuring the additionality of carbon emissions.
The inherent complexity of measuring additionality cannot be
understated. Measuring additionality is a near impossible task and both
California’s program and the cap-and-trade program established by the
Kyoto Protocol have endured this criticism.232 When reviewing greenhouse
gas emissions regulatory regimes, courts are also limited in their standard of
review for two reasons: (1) statutory restrictions; and (2) they have
essentially no expertise in determining whether one additionality
measurement system is more reasonable than another.233 A direct tax on
greenhouse gas emissions would avoid all of these issues and focus simply
on the amount of emissions actually emitted by a given source—a task
much more easily understood than measuring the amount of carbon
emissions that would not have been emitted in the hypothetical scenario
wherein a cap-and-trade program did not exist.
As a result of the underlying political unpopularity of taxing
greenhouse gas emissions, states are left with an indirect method of forcing
industry to reduce their carbon emissions. However, at this point in time,
any method of regulating greenhouse gas emissions is sorely needed.
Taxing carbon directly would probably be an easier and more effective
method of regulating greenhouse gas emissions, but political feasibility
must inevitably be considered when adopting a law with such far-reaching
impacts. Currently, the most politically popular method of regulating a
state’s carbon emissions on a broad scale appears to be cap-and-trade.
States should adopt policies to support a cap-and-trade program and either
create their own system or join an existing one.
California and
Massachusetts have proven the early viability of these regional programs
and have the growing institutional expertise needed to assist other states in
participating in this effort.
Even though standardized additionality
mechanisms have come under fire, they could ultimately prove to be an
improvement from traditional case-by-case measurement systems. States
need to begin limiting greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible and
cap-and-trade appears to be the most politically feasible method of doing
so.

232. See, e.g., Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2884 (2014), and 134 S. Ct. 2875 (2014); Cal. Exec. Order S01-07 (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/fuels/lcfs/eos0107.pdf.
233. See Citizens Climate Lobby v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., No. CGC-12-519554, 2013
WL 861396, at *10 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 2013).
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V. Conclusion
In sum, California and Massachusetts provide other states with models
for regulating greenhouse gas emissions within their own states. Their
experiences in designing policy and defending agency action in court
highlight the challenges that other states should work to avoid when making
their own climate change law. States should adopt both fuel standards and
cap-and-trade programs as soon as possible because these are the best
politically viable tools for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The early
efforts of California and Massachusetts should serve other states as a guide
to establishing these regulatory programs.
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